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Cooperation and diversity abound in nature despite cooperators risking exploi-
tation from defectors and superior competitors displacing weaker ones.
Understanding the persistence of cooperation and diversity is therefore a
major problem for evolutionary ecology, especially in the context of well-
mixed populations, where the potential for exploitation and displacement is
greatest. Here, we demonstrate that a ‘loner effect’, described by economic
game theorists, can maintain cooperation and diversity in real-world biological
settings. We use mathematical models of public-good-producing bacteria to
show that the presence of a loner strain, which produces an independent but
relatively inefficient good, can lead to rock–paper–scissor dynamics, whereby
cooperators outcompete loners, defectors outcompete cooperators and loners
outcompete defectors. These model predictions are supported by our obser-
vations of evolutionary dynamics in well-mixed experimental communities of
the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa. We find that the coexistence of coopera-
tors and defectors that produce and exploit, respectively, the iron-scavenging
siderophore pyoverdine, is stabilized by the presence of lonerswith an indepen-
dent iron-uptake mechanism. Our results establish the loner effect as a simple
and general driver of cooperation and diversity in environments that would
otherwise favour defection and the erosion of diversity.
1. Introduction
Explaining the maintenance of cooperation and diversity are major challenges
for evolutionary ecology [1–5]. The ‘survival of the fittest’ means that cooperative
behaviour is prone to exploitation from defectors that free-ride on the help of
others and suggests that diversity will be eroded as superior forms displace
weaker ones. Theoretical work indicates that spatial genetic structure (i.e. geneti-
cally related individuals living in close proximity) may promote both cooperation
and diversity [5–9], but other studies have shown that it is certainly not sufficient
[10,11] andmay even be obstructive [12–15]. Moreover, many biological settings,
including some natural aquatic environments, are characterized by a lack of sig-
nificant spatial genetic structure, yet they still maintain cooperative and diverse
communities [16,17]. This raises the question of what other processes can explain
the high levels of cooperation and diversity observed in nature.
Beyond evolutionary ecology, economic game theorists have proposed a
simple mechanism—the ‘loner effect’—that can maintain cooperation and diver-
sity, even in the absence of spatial genetic structure [18]. The idea is that, in
environments that would otherwise favour defection, cooperators can coexist
with defectors when in the presence of a loner that has an independent lifestyle
and is therefore not involved in the others’ social interactions. Specifically, this
& 2016 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
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can occur when the loner strategy outcompetes the defector but
then creates conditions that favour the cooperator in turn, lead-
ing to cyclical, ‘rock–paper–scissor’ dynamics. In economics,
the loner has been envisioned as a cognitive strategy, whereby
a human subject opts out of a public goods game to accept an
alternative pay-off [19]. However, we suggest that this mechan-
ism may apply widely across the whole diversity of life,
including to the mindless social traits of microorganisms. The
occurrence of loners could therefore explain the maintenance
of cooperation and diversity in a wide range of biological
settings that lack significant spatial genetic structure.
Here, we test the hypothesis that the loner effect has
application beyond economics and specifically to a system
of cooperative public goods production in bacteria. We
develop a mathematical model to examine how the loner
effect can apply to a public goods dilemma faced by sidero-
phore-producing bacteria, and we experimentally determine
whether or not the loner effect can maintain siderophore pro-
duction and diversity in evolving communities of
Pseudomonas aeruginosa. This bacterium produces pyoverdine,
a diffusible siderophore that is released into the extracellular
environment where it can solubilize iron for the producer cell
and for other cells in the neighbourhood [20,21]. The non-
excludability of pyoverdine means that producer cells (i.e.
cooperators) can be exploited by mutant cells that benefit
from siderophores but do not produce any themselves (i.e.
defectors) [22–24]. Furthermore, pyoverdine requires a
specific receptor for uptake, and a great diversity of pyover-
dine-receptor pairs exists among P. aeruginosa and other
Pseudomonas strains [25,26]. Consequently, in natural Pseudo-
monas communities, cooperator strains likely face both
exploitation by defectors and competition from other Pseudo-
monas strains with their own iron-acquisition systems (i.e.
loners). This could set the stage for rock–paper–scissor
dynamics driven by the succession of cooperators, defectors
and loners.
2. Material and methods
(a) A mathematical model of strain dynamics in
Pseudomonas communities
To predict the dynamics and stability of Pseudomonas commu-
nities, we developed a mathematical model based on our
observations of siderophore biology. In the basic model, we con-
sider a large population of bacterial cells, with a proportion pC
producing and using costly siderophores (cooperators), a pro-
portion pD only using the producer’s siderophore (defectors)
and the remaining proportion pL ¼ 1 2 pC– pD producing and
using a different, less-efficient siderophore (loners), in a context
where access to siderophores is necessary for growth. We use
this basic model to examine a two-strategy system consisting of
cooperators and defectors only ( pL ¼ 0) and the complete
three-strategy system consisting of cooperators, defectors and
loners. Later, we add an extension to examine the occurrence
of de novo mutant strategies.
We assume that cells in the population are well mixed (i.e. no
spatial genetic structure), but we allow for social interactions
to occur in local neighbourhoods of n cells (e.g. as reported for
bacterial interactions on suspended particles in an otherwise
poorly structured, aquatic environment [27]). Our assumption
implies that the timescale of social interaction is fast, and the
timescale of the cellular birth–death process is slow, relative to
the mixing of cells within the entire population. Accordingly,
the composition of a focal cell’s neighbourhood is a random
draw from the multinomial distribution, with parameters n2 1
and p ¼ ( pC, pD, pL). Note that, while we consider stochasticity
at the level of individual cells, in terms of the random compo-
sition of their social environments, these effects average out
at the level of the whole population, which comprises a very
large number of cells. Hence, we assume that the overall
population dynamics are deterministic.
We consider that a siderophore-producing cell retains a
fraction g of its siderophores (as postulated by Zhang & Rainey
[28] and Ku¨mmerli & Ross-Gillespie [29]) and releases the
remainder 12g as a public good. A fraction a of the public
good is shared equally among all individuals in the neighbour-
hood who are able to use it (including the producer), and the
remainder 12a is shared equally among all individuals in the
population who are able to use it. It is important to note that
we assume that siderophores are not lost due to diffusion,
which is a simplifying but reasonable assumption for closed
and well-mixed systems, where siderophores and cells can
meet at any point in time and space. Consequently, a cooperator
cell enjoys a pay-off PC ¼ g þ (12 g)(af[1 þ xC]/[1 þ xC þ
xD]g þ (12 a)f[ pC]/[ pC þ pD]g) 2 c, where xC and xD are the
multinomially distributed numbers of (other) cooperators and
defectors in its neighbourhood, respectively, and c is the cost
of siderophore production (scaled so the benefit associated
with a unit of the cooperator’s siderophore is 1). Accordingly, a
defector’s pay-off is PD ¼ (1 2 g)(af[xC]/[1 þ xC þ xD]g þ (1 2
a)f[ pC]/[ pC þ pD]g) and a loner’s pay-off is PL ¼ b2 c, where
c, b, 1 describes the relative efficiency of the loner’s sidero-
phore. We also extend the basic model to consider the
evolution of a ‘loner-defector’ (LD) strategy, which exploits the
loner’s siderophore and occurs with frequency pLD. This yields
pay-offs PC¼ g þ (12 g)(af[1 þ xC]/[1 þ xCþ xD]g þ (12a)
f[pC]/[pCþ pD]g)2 c, PD¼ (12g)(af[xC]/[1 þ xCþ xD]gþ(12a)
f[pC]/[pCþ pD]g), PL¼ gbþ (12g)(af[1þ xL]/[1þ xL þ xLD]g þ
(12 a)f[pL]/[pL þ pLD]g)b2 c and PLD¼ (12 g)(af[xL]/[1 þ
xL þ xLD]g þ (12 a)f[pL]/[pL þ pLD]g)b.
We derive the Malthusian growth rate mS of a strain adopting
strategy S [ fC, D, L, LDg and use this to calculate each
strain’s change in frequency over time, dpS/dt. Specifically, the
growth rate of strain S is given by mS ¼ !PS # !P, where
!PS ¼
P
xC,xD,xL,xLDcðxC, xD, xL, xLDj pC, pD, pL, pLDÞ !PS is the
average pay-off among all cells of that lineage,
!P ¼PS[{C,D,L,LD} pS PS is the average pay-off among all cells in
the population, and c(xC, xD, xL, xLDjpC, pD, pL, pLD) ¼ ([n 2
1]!/[xC!xD!xL!xLD!])( pCxC pDxDpLxLpLDxLD) is the multinomial
probability distribution function. In addition to these growth
pay-offs, we assume that strain frequencies may change by
non-selective processes (including mutation, plasmid infection
or migration), occurring at rate m, hereafter described as the
‘mutation rate’. For simplicity, and without affecting the results,
we consider that mutations change a particular strain type
into the type that can directly outcompete it (i.e. C! D, D!
L, L! C or LD) [30]. After incorporating the mutation rate, the
deterministic rate of change of each strain is
d pC
dt
¼ mC pC # m pC þ 12m pL, ð2:1aÞ
dpD
dt
¼ mDpD # mpD þ mpC, ð2:1bÞ
d pL
dt
¼ mL pL # m pL þ m pD ð2:1cÞ
and
d pLD
dt
¼ mLD pLD # m pLD þ 12m pL: ð2:1dÞ
This formulation applies to the four-strategy system, but the
three-strategy system (cooperator–defector–loner) or the
two-strategy system (cooperator–defector) is recovered by
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setting pLD ¼ 0 or pL ¼ pLD ¼ 0, respectively, and by changing
the mutational connectivity accordingly.
(b) Pseudomonas strains used for empirical tests
We used a total of 11 strains of P. aeruginosa (for a complete list of
strains, see the electronic supplementary material, table S1). As
the cooperator, we used the standard laboratory strain PAO1
(ATCC 15692), a wild-type producer of pyoverdine type 1
and its fluorescently tagged variant PAO1-gfp (isopropyl-b-D-
thiogalactopyranoside (IPTG)-inducible, green-fluorescent
marker, chromosomal insertion attTn7::Ptac-lacI-egfp). As the
defector, we used PAO1DpvdD pchEF and its fluorescently
tagged variant PAO1DpvdD pchEF-echerry (IPTG-inducible, red-
fluorescent marker, attTn7::Ptac-lacI-echerry), knockout mutants
that neither produce pyoverdine type 1 nor pyochelin (the
secondary siderophore of this species). We used a double-
knockout mutant to rule out pleiotropic effects associated with
pyoverdine deletions, such as the upregulation of pyochelin in
particular. Pyochelin is typically repressed when pyoverdine is
produced (as in our cooperator and loner strain) but is syn-
thesized at high rates in pyoverdine-negative strains [31]. By
using a double-knockout strain, we could entirely focus on the
effect of pyoverdine (since none of the three strains produced
pyochelin) and rule out all potential side effects introduced
by pyochelin production (for instance, the possibility that the
loner and the cooperator exploit the pyochelin produced by the
defector). In one instance where it was an appropriate control,
we also used PAO1DpvdD, a strain that is defective for pyover-
dine production only. Finally, we considered six putative loner
strains, all of which are clinical or environmental isolates, and
thus represent natural (rather than engineered) loners that
cooperators and defectors might face in real-world settings (elec-
tronic supplementary material, table S1). All putative loners
produce a pyoverdine type that is different from the one pro-
duced by the cooperator PAO1 [25]. We assume that the
different pyoverdine types mainly differ in their affinity to iron
(i.e. in the benefit they can generate) and not in their production
costs because the pyoverdine synthesis machinery is similar in all
strains [26].
(c) Competition assays
We carried out competition experiments by inoculating 7.5 ml
of both competing strains at an OD (optical density at 600 nm) of
1 into 1.485 ml of iron-limited media consisting of casamino
acids (CAA) medium (5 g casamino acids, 1.18 g K2HPO4 &
3H2O, 0.25 g MgSO4 & 7H2O l–1) and supplemented with
20 mM NaHCO3 (sodium bicarbonate) and 100 mg ml21 human
apo-transferrin (all from Sigma-Aldrich, Switzerland) in 24-well
cell culture plates. Plates were subsequently incubated at 378C
and shaken at 220 r.p.m. for 24 h. Colony forming units (CFUs)
were counted by serially diluting and plating each competition
on lysogeny broth (LB) agar supplemented with 1 mM FeCl3 and
1 mM IPTG. Plates were incubated for 24 h at 378C and left at
room temperature (208C) for another 48 h to allow the fluorescent
markers to mature. A transilluminator (DR88X, Clare Chemical
Research) was used to differentiate between the fluorescently
tagged strains. The relative fitness of each strain in each competition
was calculated as v ¼ [q2(12 q1)]/[q1(12 q2)], where q1 and q2 are,
respectively, the initial and final proportionsof thebacterial strain of
interest [32].
To first check whether the fluorescent markers affected
strain fitness, we competed our marked strains against their
unmarked ancestral variants in iron-limited CAA medium. We
could not detect any significant difference in relative growth bet-
ween marked and unmarked strains (relative fitness of marked
strain did not differ from v¼ 1, the expected value, for gfp-
marker: v¼ 1.51+0.63, one-sample t-test, t7 ¼ 1.585, p ¼ 0.16;
for mcherry-marker: v ¼ 1.05+0.14, one-sample t-test, t7 ¼ 0.644,
p ¼ 0.54). This shows that strain dynamics should not be
influenced by the fluorescent markers.
Next, we tested whether strains of P. aeruginosa producing a
different pyoverdine type can act as loners (i.e. can outcompete
defectors but get outcompeted by cooperators). To do this, we
first performed pairwise competition experiments between the
six putative loner strains against PAO1 and PAO1DpvdD pchEF
(four replicates per competition). These assays identified strain
ATCC 013 as a potential loner (i.e. outcompeting the defector,
but losing against the cooperator). In order to confirm that
these competitive differences were in fact due to pyoverdine,
and not just based on other competitive factors affecting
growth rate, we repeated the competition experiments in CAA
medium supplemented with 20 mM FeSO4. In this iron-replete
environment, the production of pyoverdine is not required, and
therefore we expect the loner effect to disappear. In particular,
the defector and cooperator strain become phenotypically identical
when iron is replete (as none of the strains produces pyoverdine),
and consequently the loner should perform similarly against both
strains (i.e. either win, lose or grow equally well). Furthermore, we
used the strain triplet PAO1, PAO1DpvdD pchEF and ATCC 013, to
test four key assumptions of our model: (i) access to pyoverdine is
required for growth; (ii) pyoverdine production is costly (c. 0);
(iii) the producer cell retains a proportion of its pyoverdine for
its own use (g. 0) and (iv) the pyoverdine produced by the
loner is less efficient than the pyoverdine produced by the coopera-
tor (b, 1). The exact methods for these tests are described in the
electronic supplementary material and [33,34].
(d) Experimental evolution
We used experimental evolution to test our model predictions
about strain dynamics and community stability. A primary aim
of these experiments was to compare the dynamics and stability
of two-strain communities, initially composed of cooperators
and defectors only, with that of three-strain communities, initially
composed of cooperators, defectors and loners. For this compari-
son, we performed experimental evolution with replicate
communities (n ¼ 12) over 10 days (approx. 50 bacterial gener-
ations). Separately, we also performed experimental evolution
with all two-strain communities (cooperator versus defector, coop-
erator versus loner, loner versus defector) over 5 days (approx. 25
bacterial generations) in sixfold replication for each strain combi-
nation. Experimental evolution was carried out across relatively
short timescales because Pseudomonas strains are known to rapidly
adapt to laboratory conditions, and such adaptations could distort
the evolutionary dynamics of interest [35].
Evolution experiments were carried out in 24-well plates, filled
with 1.5 ml of iron-limitedCAAmedia, and bacterial culture (50 ml
of each strain at the start, OD of each strain adjusted to 1). To pre-
vent contamination between wells, we filled every second well
only (hence 12 of the 24 wells were inoculated). Plates were sub-
sequently placed in a 378C incubator and shaken at 220 r.p.m for
24 h. Following growth, 150 ml of bacterial culture was transferred
to fresh media every 24 h for the duration of the experiment. After
transferring to newmedia, the bacterial competitions were serially
diluted and plated on iron-supplemented LB agar. These were
incubated for 24 h at 378C and left at room temperature (208C)
for another 48 h. CFUs were counted using a transilluminator.
(e) Screening of evolved clones
To assess the emergence of de novo defectors in pyoverdine-
producing strains (i.e. PAO1 and ATCC 013) in our evolution
experiments, we assayed pyoverdine production in these
strains over time. In the 10-day experiments comparing
two-strain (cooperator–defector) and three-strain (cooperator–
defector–loner) communities, we screened pyoverdine producers
rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org
Proc.R.Soc.B
283:20152682
3
 on January 13, 2016http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from 
at days 5 and 10 of the experiment (120 clones for each commu-
nity). In the 5-day experiments with two-strain communities
(cooperator versus defector, cooperator versus loner, loner
versus defector), we screened 48 clones from each community
for pyoverdine production daily of either PAO1 (in the cooperator
versus defector and cooperator versus loner competitions) or
ATCC 013 (in the loner versus defector competition). Each bac-
terial competition was plated on iron-supplemented LB agar,
and clones of either PAO1 or ATCC013 were isolated from each
replicate. Pyoverdine production was assayed by culturing these
clones in a 96-well plate containing 200 ml iron-limited CAA for
24 h at 378C. Pyoverdine production for each clone was quantified
using the RFU/OD measure described above. We defined strains
as de novo defectors if their RFU/OD was 75% or less than that
of the ancestral wild-type (for further details, see the electronic
supplementary material, figure S2).
3. Results
(a) Identification of a putative Pseudomonas loner
strain
We found that one of the six candidate strains, ATCC
013, behaved as a loner—that is, it was outcompeted by the
cooperator (relative fitness with 95% confidence intervals v ¼
1.60+0.18, one-sample t-test, t11 ¼ 6.57, p, 0.0001), but out-
competed the defector (v ¼ 1.24+0.15, one-sample t-test,
t11 ¼ 3.24, p ¼ 0.008; electronic supplementary material,
figure S1). Crucially, the ATCC 013 loner and the PAO1 coop-
erator each produce a different, mutually exclusive pyoverdine
type [36]. Competition in iron-replete media, where no pyover-
dine is produced, confirmed that the above competitive
differences were due to the differential production and use of
pyoverdine, and not due to other factors affecting strain
growth rates. Specifically, the loner effect disappeared in
iron-replete media, where ATCC 013 significantly out-
competed the cooperator (v ¼ 0.58+0.24, one-sample t-test,
t7 ¼ 43.4, p ¼ 0.012) and the defector (v ¼ 1.62+0.45, one-
sample t-test, t7 ¼ 2.7, p ¼ 0.031; electronic supplementary
material, figure S2). Moreover, as expected given that the com-
petition between cooperators and defectors was dependent
on iron availability, the defector outcompeted the cooperator
under iron-limited conditions (v ¼ 2.6+1.04, one-sample
t-test, t7 ¼ 3.03, p ¼ 0.019; electronic supplementary mate-
rial, figures S1 and S2), but not under iron-replete conditions
(v ¼ 0.8+0.31, one-sample t-test, t7 ¼ 1.25, p ¼ 0.25; electronic
supplementary material, figure S2), where pyoverdine pro-
duction is switched off. Altogether, these results suggest that
ATCC 013 could act as a true loner in a community of PAO1
(cooperator) andPAO1DpvdDpchEF (defector) in the iron-limited
conditions where pyoverdine is required for growth.
(b) Testing model assumptions
Weusedour strain triplet (PAO1, PAO1DpvdDpchEF, ATCC013)
to test key assumptions of our model, and found all of them to
hold: (i) siderophores are important for growth, as indicated by
pyoverdine producers growing significantly better than pyover-
dine-deficient defectors (cooperator OD after 24 h¼ 0.601+
0.036, loner OD¼ 0.460+0.007, defector OD¼ 0.041+0.0001;
two-sample t-tests: cooperator versus defector, t9 ¼ 30.8, p,
0.0001, loner versus defector, t9 ¼ 120.9, p, 0.0001); (ii) the
cost c of siderophore production is substantial, as confirmed by
our estimate of c ¼ 0.197; (iii) the fraction g of siderophores that
producers retain for themselves is low, as supported by our
iron-chelation assay revealing g¼ 0.05 and (iv) the cooperator’s
siderophore is more efficient in delivering iron to the cell than
is the loner’s siderophore (b, 1), as demonstrated by our iron-
chelation assays yielding b¼ 0.74 for the loner’s pyoverdine.
(c) Loss of diversity in two-strain Pseudomonas
communities
In pairwise competition, our model predicts that cooperators
will displace loners (given b, 1), loners will displace defec-
tors (given b. c), and—if siderophores are sufficiently costly
(large c)—defectors will replace cooperators. As an illustrative
example of the latter result, we derive analytical results for a
simple case with n ¼ 2, g ¼ 0 and a ¼ 1 (but we emphasize
that our model applies more generally). In this case, we find
that cooperation is an evolutionarily-stable strategy (ESS;
[37]) when siderophores are cheap (c, 1/2) and defection
is an ESS when siderophores are costly (c. 1/2) (see the
electronic supplementary material).
In support of these predictions, we found that in experimen-
tal evolution with two-strain Pseudomonas communities:
cooperators displaced loners (figure 1a, see also the electronic
supplementary material figure S3a for individual replicates),
loners displaced defectors (figure 1b and electronic supple-
mentary material, figure S3b), and defectors outcompeted
cooperators (figure 1c and electronic supplementary material,
figure S3c). Even though defectors steadily increased in fre-
quency during the initial phase of the experiment when
competed against cooperators, we found that by day 5 their
increase had slowed and that this coincided with the emergence
of de novo defector mutants (i.e. mutants that produce signifi-
cantly less pyoverdine than the ancestral wild-type) in all
replicates (figure 1c and electronic supplementary material,
figures S4 and S5). The appearance of de novo defectors in the
cooperator background is a well-described phenomenon
[22,23], and these defectors are known to spread because of an
improved siderophore exploitation strategy [38]. In support of
this, we found that by the end of our 10-day experiments, a mix-
ture of de novo and ancestral defectors had displaced
cooperators in 11 out of 12 replicates (electronic supplementary
material, figures S4 and S5). This strongly suggests that, in our
well-mixed experimental setting, defectors ultimately displace
cooperators.
(d) Maintenance of cooperation and diversity in three-
strain Pseudomonas communities
After experimentally confirming that all strain pairs of co-
operators, defectors and loners cannot coexist in tandem, we
theoretically examined the necessary conditions for all three
strains to coexist. Building on our illustrative example above
(with n ¼ 2, g ¼ 0 and a ¼ 1), we find that if individuals may
adopt a loner strategy then, while cooperation remains an
ESS when siderophores are cheap (c, 1/2), there is no pure-
strategy ESSwhen siderophores are costly (c. 1/2) and amix-
ture of all three strategies is maintained. The mixture admits a
locally stable equilibrium point at which the pay-offs for the
three strategies are equal, but the strain frequencies always
cycle around this equilibrium (see the electronic supple-
mentary material). Thus, the presence of the loner promotes
both cooperation and diversity through rock–paper–scissors
dynamics. This is because the presence of loners in a
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cooperator’s neighbourhood reduces the number of cells that
can use the public good, thus increasing the cooperator’s
share. When cooperation is rare, loners outcompete defectors
and rise to high frequency, which alters the social environment
in a way that promotes cooperation. A necessary condition for
the promotion of cooperation and maintenance of polymorph-
ism is that loners do not ‘soak up’ the cooperator’s public good
(i.e. take it up without benefiting from it [39]; see the electronic
supplementary material for a model variant with soaking).
We use a numerical analysis to recover the analytical
results above and to confirm that the same qualitative dynamics
obtain for more realistic scenarios with n. 2, g. 0 and a, 1
(figure 2a–c; see also the electronic supplementary material,
figure S6a–c for time-series plots and figure S7 for additional
parameter combinations). Cooperation remains an ESS when
siderophores are sufficiently cheap, although larger neighbour-
hood size tends to inhibit pure cooperation (e.g.wheng ¼ 0 and
a ¼ 1, cooperation is an ESS only if c, 1/n). This is because, in
a larger neighbourhood, a focal cooperator would receive a
smaller share of the benefit from its own siderophores. By con-
trast, when siderophores are sufficiently costly (e.g. c. 1/n
when g ¼ 0 and a ¼ 1), all three strategies are maintained in
rock–paper–scissors dynamics so long as g is sufficiently low
and a is sufficiently high (figure 2a–c), such that most sidero-
phores are shared as public goods within the producer’s
neighbourhood (see further details in the electronic supplemen-
tary material). Larger neighbourhood size tends to increase the
amplitude of cycles (results not shown), implying that, in a
finite population of large social neighbourhoods, cyclical
dynamics could be destroyed by the stochastic fixation of a
single type.
Next, we used experimental evolution to directly examine
community stability and strain dynamics in communities
initially composed of cooperators, defectors and loners. In all
replicates, we observed coexistence of all three strains and
cyclical shifts in strain frequencies, consistent with the rock–
paper–scissors dynamics predicted by our model (figure 2d;
see also the electronic supplementary material, figure S6d for
a time-series plot and figure S8 for dynamics of individual
replicates). We further examined whether de novo defectors
also emerged in the three-strain communities as previously
described for our two-strain communities (figure 1). We
indeed found that such de novo defectors also evolved in the
three-strain communities by day 5 (electronic supplementary
material, figures S4 and S5). However, their prevalencewas sig-
nificantly lower than in the two-strain communities (Fisher’s
exact test for comparisons of de novo defector frequencies
after 5 days: p ¼ 0.018, and after 10 days: p ¼ 0.0001), and the
prevalence of the original cooperator strain (producing orig-
inal pyoverdine levels) was always approximately six-times
higher in three-strain communities than it was in two-strain
communities (electronic supplementary material, figure S4).
These comparisons show that de novo defectors are unlikely
to affect community stability in our three-strain communities.
However, in addition to these de novo defectors, we also
observed the evolution of de novo loner-defectors (electronic
supplementary material, figure S3b). These are mutants that
could potentially exploit the loner’s pyoverdine and could
therefore undermine community stability in the long term.
(e) Maintenance of cooperation diversity in four-strain
Pseudomonas communities
To theoretically explore the effect of de novo loner-defectors on
community stability, we analysed the complete four-strategy
system in equation (2.1). Our analytical model results for n¼ 2,
g ¼ 0 and a ¼ 1 (see the electronic supplementary material)
and numerical analyses for n. 2, g. 0 and a, 1 reveal that
the addition of a loner-defector can result in three possible evol-
utionary outcomes: (i) when siderophores are cheap (low c),
cooperation is strongly favoured, which eliminates the loner-
defector; (ii) when siderophores are costly (high c), both
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Figure 1. Loss of diversity in two-strain communities and the origin of
de novo defectors. Coexistence is not possible in two-strain communities,
where (a) the cooperator (dark blue) displaced the loner (red); (b) the
loner (red) displaced the defector (white) and (c) the defector (white) out-
competed the cooperator (dark blue). In addition, de novo defectors arose
both in the loner and the cooperator backgrounds (salmon-coloured and
light blue-coloured branches, respectively).
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defector strategies (D and LD) are favoured and maintained in
a stable polymorphism; (iii) when the cost of siderophores is
intermediate, the loner-defector is eliminated and the three
remaining strains display rock–paper–scissors dynamics
(figure 3a; see also the electronic supplementary material,
figure S9a for a time-series plot and figure S10 for additional
parameter combinations).
To determine which of these outcomes applies to our
experimental system, we isolated six independent de novo
loner-defectors at random and competed them against the
other three strains in the community (i.e. cooperator, defector
and loner). We found that the loner-defectors outcompeted the
ancestral loner (relative fitness with 95% confidence intervals
v ¼ 1.65+0.09, one-sample t-test, t5 ¼ 14.74, p, 0.0001). By
contrast, we could detect no fitness advantage enjoyed by the
loner-defectors over the defector (v ¼ 1.70+1.61, one-sample
t-test, t8 ¼ 0.82, p ¼ 0.42), and all loner-defectors dramatically
lost out in competition with the cooperator (v ¼ 0.10+0.04,
t11 ¼ 48.68, p, 0.0001). Given this highly imbalanced fitness
network, where loner-defectors are almost completely dis-
placed by cooperators within 24 h, we predicted that the
four-strain system will typically be unstable [40]. Indeed, in
an evolutionary experiment with four-strain communities,
the loner-defector rapidly dropped to low frequency, going
extinct in three of the six replicates, while the original three
strains displayed typical rock–paper–scissor dynamics
(figure 3b and see also the electronic supplementary material,
figure S9b for a time-series plot and figure S11 for dynamics
of individual replicates). Hence, the emergence of loner-defec-
tors does not necessarily eliminate the cooperation and
diversity that is maintained by the presence of a loner.
4. Discussion
Our results yield novel insights into how cooperation and diver-
sity can be stabilized in real-world natural communities.
Building on previous theory [18], our models of public-goods-
producing bacteria predict that cooperator and defector strains
can coexistwith a loner strain, using its own independent public
good, in cyclical rock–paper–scissor dynamics (figure 2a–c).
This prediction was supported by our observations of open-
ended evolutionary dynamics in siderophore-producing
communities of Pseudomonas. Under well-mixed conditions
that favour defectors over cooperators (figures 1c and electronic
supplementarymaterial, figure S5a), we found that the presence
of a loner strain can stabilize the coexistence of defectors
and cooperators (figure 2d and electronic supplementary
c = 0.25
c = 0.35
g = 0.1
g = 0
g = 0.2
a = 0.2
a = 1
a = 0.6
c = 0.15
C CD D
C CD D
(a)
(c) (d )
(b)L L
L L
Figure 2. Maintenance of cooperation and diversity in three-strain communities. Triangular plots of deterministic numerical analyses, showing that in communities
consisting of a cooperator (C), a defector (D) and a loner (L), rock–paper–scissors dynamics arise when: (a) the cost c of siderophores is sufficiently high; (b) the
proportion g of siderophores retained by the cooperator for personal use is low and (c) the proportion a of siderophores being shared in local neighbourhoods is
high. All analyses start with strain types at equal frequency (one-third, shown by the black circle) and, unless otherwise specified, parameters are c ¼ 0.3, b ¼ 0.7,
a ¼ 1, g ¼ 0, n ¼ 5, m ¼ 0. (d ) Experiments with three-strain communities of Pseudomonas bacteria recover the theoretically predicted rock–paper–scissors
dynamics (grey lines show 12 independent replicates; black line shows the mean over 10 days of experimental evolution).
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material, figure S8). Moreover, this dynamic coexistence of
cooperators, defectors and loners was not destroyed by the
origin of defectors that exploit the loner (figure 3 and electronic
supplementarymaterial, figure S11). Hence, our results suggest
that the loner effect is a robust mechanism that can drive
the maintenance of cooperation and diversity in an environ-
ment that would otherwise favour defection and the erosion
of diversity.
Our model predicts that the loner effect can operate only
when public goods sharing is sufficiently local. That is,
althoughwe assumed that cells are mixed such that genetically
related individuals are not in close proximity (i.e. no spatial
genetic structure), the maintenance of cooperation and diver-
sity requires that cells interact in local neighbourhoods [18].
This is because, in the absence of spatial genetic structure, selec-
tion can favour public goods production only if the benefit of
producing the good sufficiently feeds back to the producer
cell itself (a direct fitness benefit of cooperation). Under these
conditions, the loner effect works because loners occupy
space between cooperators and defectors, thereby shielding
the public good from defectors. Specifically, the presence of
the loner reduces the number of neighbours that can benefit
from the cooperator’s public good, which in turn increases
the direct fitness benefit that a cooperator cell gains from
its own secreted molecules. Hence, our observation that coop-
erator, defector and loner strains can coexist in Pseudomonas
communities suggests that, despite interacting in shaken
media, there was some mechanism to keep pyoverdine mol-
ecules sufficiently local, resulting in a direct benefit of
cooperation in the presence of loners. For instance, high cell
density could ensure that pyoverdine molecules never diffuse
very far beforemeeting another cell, such that iron-loadedmol-
ecules are usually sharedwithin the local neighbourhood of the
producer. Alternatively, it has been shown that turbulences,
which could have been induced by our shaking procedure,
can lead to the formation of micro-scale patches where
neighbours, and perhaps their secreted products, stay together
[41]. Further studies will be necessary to elucidate these
mechanisms and to determine whether they also occur in
other well-mixed natural settings.
Our study provides a unique example of how rock–paper–
scissor dynamics can maintain biological diversity. Our
finding that cooperation and diversity are maintained in
well-mixed populations sets our study apart from most
previous theoretical and empirical work, where rock–paper–
scissor dynamics exclusively occurred in genetically structured
environments [42–45]. For instance, Kerr et al. [44] showed that
coexistence between toxin-producing, toxin-sensitive and
toxin-resistant bacterial strains was only possible in environ-
ments with both local toxin interactions and local cell
dispersal. This is because the selective advantage enjoyed by
a rare toxin-producing strain derives from eliminating unre-
lated cells that are competing locally with their genetic
relatives; by contrast, those genetic relatives are locally absent
in well-mixed populations, such that the rare toxin-producing
strain would enjoy no selective advantage [46]. More recently,
Kelsic et al. [47] extended the classic antibiotic producer–
resistant–sensitive model to include extracellular antibiotic
degradation, showing that coexistence of all three-strain types
can occur even when cells are well mixed. Hence, similar to the
lonereffect, thismodel illustrates thatdiversity canbemaintained
when social interactions are local but cell dispersal is global.
Althoughwe have focused on Pseudomonas communities in
our study, it is important to note that the role of the loner is
potentially very general and may even be enacted by organ-
isms belonging to a different taxonomic group than the
cooperator and the defector. In aquatic microbial systems, for
example, the loner could be a distinct bacterial species or
potentially even a small eukaryote, such as an alga. Moreover,
our study suggests that the loner strategy is not limited to
cognitively advanced economic agents like humans [19] but
can also be employed by simple unicellular organisms such
as bacteria or amoeba [48]. This highlights that community
stability and the maintenance of cooperation are emergent
properties of the loner presence and do not require adaptations
from the organisms themselves. The loner effect is therefore
different from adaptive responses, such as the evolution of
kin recognition mechanisms [49]; metabolic optimizations
that reduce the cost of public good production [50,51] and
the evolution of less-diffusible metabolites [52], which can
C 
D
L 
LD
C 
D
L 
LD
c = 0.15
c = 0.25
c = 0.35
(b)(a)
Figure 3. Maintenance of cooperation and diversity in four-strain communities. (a) Tetrahedral plot of deterministic numerical analyses, showing that in commu-
nities consisting of a cooperator (C), a defector (D), a loner (L) and a de novo evolved loner-defector (LD), C will dominate when the cost c of siderophores is low;
the two defectors will dominate when c is high and LD will go extinct, while the other three strains return to cyclical rock–paper–scissors dynamics, when c is
intermediate. All analyses start with strain types at equal frequency (one-fourth, shown by the black circle) and, unless otherwise specified, parameters are b ¼ 0.7,
a ¼ 0.8, g ¼ 0.05, n ¼ 5, m ¼ 0. (b) Experiments with four-strain Pseudomonas communities support the intermediate-cost scenario, as indicated by the
significant drop in loner-defector frequency and the rock–paper–scissors cycling of the remaining three strains (grey lines show six independent replicates;
black line shows the mean over 5 days of experimental evolution).
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also contribute to the maintenance of cooperation in the
absence of spatial genetic structure.
Finally, we propose that public goods cooperation itself can
favour the evolution of loners and may therefore promote
diversity via a multi-step evolutionary process. This is in fact
evidenced by our open-ended evolutionary study in which
bacteria were not confined to an artificially minimal stra-
tegy set but were instead able to innovate new strategies in a
naturalistic way. Similarly, we expect that in a well-mixed
population of cooperators, defectors will first arise and enjoy
an evolutionary advantage. In turn, these defectors may
modify their environment in a way that favours the evolution
of loners whose public goods are accessible to neither coopera-
tors nor defectors. The resulting three-strain community can be
either: (i) transitive, and reverting to a one-strategy community
dominated by a superior loner; (ii) non-transitive, and leading
to rock–paper–scissors dynamics, as observed in our study or
(iii) open-ended, and evolving into higher-order systems with
multiple cooperators and defectors coexisting, at least tempor-
arily [40]. Our results provide an empirical basis to theoretical
work having proposed that social interactions mediated by
toxins [53], signalling molecules [54] and siderophores [30]
can drive diversification in microbial communities [55]. Our
study of the loner effect adds a simple and general principle
to a number of alternative mechanisms—including density
reduction via interspecific competition [56] and shared anti-
biotic degradation [47]—that may be common in well-mixed
microbial communities and could contribute to maintenance
of both cooperation and biodiversity.
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Presence of a loner strain maintains cooperation and diversity in well-mixed bacterial 
communities 
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1. Supplementary methods for tests of model assumptions 
To verify that pyoverdine is required for growth in our medium, we grew monocultures of cooperators 
(PAO1), defectors (PAO1ΔpvdD pchEF), and the identified loners (ATCC 013; see Results section a) 
in iron-limited CAA medium (10 replicates each). Cultures were incubated for 24 hours at 37°C under 
shaken conditions (220 rpm). We then compared growth, measured as optical density (OD) at 600nm, 
across all strains. 
  
To estimate the cost c of pyoverdine production incurred by the cooperator in competition with the 
defector, we conducted competition experiments where both strains were either cultured separately or 
mixed together at equal densities in iron-limited media (8 replicates each). Overnight cultures of both 
strains were either separately inoculated (15µl of each strain) or mixed (7.5µl of PAO1 and 7.5µl 
PAO1ΔpvdD pchEF) into 1.5ml of iron-limited media and grown for 24 hours at 37°C while shaking 
at 220 r.p.m. CFUs were counted by serially diluting each replicate and plating on iron-supplemented 
LB agar. The cost of siderophores was estimated by calculating c = wmix(v -1)/(v +1), where wmix is the 
growth (CFU/ml) of mixed cultures relative to cooperator monocultures, and v is the relative fitness of 
defectors within mixture calculated as described above.  
 
To estimate the fraction γ of pyoverdines that a producer cell keeps for itself, we quantified the 
proportion of pyoverdine that is bound to the bacterial cell membrane as opposed to being suspended 
in the supernatant. Overnight cultures of PAO1 and PAO1 ΔpvdD were grown while shaking at 37°C. 
We used PAO1 ΔpvdD as the control strain for this experiment and not the double knockout mutant 
(PAO1ΔpvdD pchEF), which we used for the evolutionary experiments, because we were specifically 
interested in the binding affinity of pyoverdine to the cell membrane, a feature that is not affected by 
pyochelin production. Cultures were diluted to an OD (600nm) of 1.6, and 2ml of each culture was 
syringe-filtered through a 0.2µm polyethersulfone (PES) membrane (Sarstedt). Cells on the membrane 
were subsequently washed with 50ml M9 salt solution in order to wash away any unbound 
pyoverdine. Cells were re-suspended in 5ml of M9 salt solution by adding this solution from the 
opposite end of the filter. Bound versus un-bound pyoverdine was measured using a CAS-assay. 
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Briefly, 100µl of CAS solution was added to either 100µl of pure culture, filtered supernatant, or 
filtered and re-suspended cells for both the pyoverdine-producer strain (PAO1) and the non-producing 
strain (PAO1 ΔpvdD) in a 96-well plate. This mixture was incubated at room temperature, in darkness 
for 30 minutes, and the colour change associated with the removal of iron (through the activity of 
pyoverdine) from the CAS solution was measured using absorbance at 630nm (Infinite 200 PRO, 
Tecan, Switzerland). OD at 600nm was also measured in samples where no CAS solution had been 
added, and standardized iron chelating activity was calculated as Mean(PAO1 ΔpvdD 
Abs630nm/(Mean(PAO1 ΔpvdD OD))) - (PAO1 Abs630nm/(Mean(PAO1 OD))), a measure that controls 
for any iron chelating activity other than via pyoverdine. 
 
To estimate the relative efficiency b of the loner’s pyoverdine, we first measured the amount of 
pyoverdine produced by PAO1 and ATCC013. Specifically, we measured the relative fluorescence 
units of pyoverdine molecules present in the growth media (excitation: 400nm, emission: 460nm), 
using a multimode microplate reader (Infinite 200 PRO, Tecan, Switzerland). RFU values were 
standardized by OD (at 600nm). Next, we quantified the iron chelating ability of the two pyoverdine 
types using the CAS-assay. Relative iron binding efficiency was then calculated as (Mean((Abs630nm of 
sterile media and CAS solution - Abs630nm of the strain and CAS solution)/Mean(OD)))/(RFU/OD).  
 
 
2. Supplementary modelling details 
(a) Modelling the 2-strategy system 
Substituting n = 2, γ = 0 and α = 1 into the model of the main text and removing L from the strategy 
set yields deterministic payoffs  PC = pC + pD(1/2) + pL- c and  PD = pC(1/2). C is an ESS when  PC > 
 PD when pC → 1, i.e. when c < ½. D is an ESS when  PD >  PC when pD → 1, i.e. when c > ½. 
Hence, for c < ½ the only pure-strategy ESS is C, and for c > ½ the only pure-strategy ESS is D. 
 
(b) Modelling the 3-strategy system 
Substituting n = 2, γ = 0 and α = 1 into the model of the main text yields deterministic payoffs  PC = 
pC + pD(1/2) + pL- c,  PD = pC(1/2) and  PL = b - c. C is an ESS when  PC >  PD and  PC >  PL when 
pC → 1, i.e. when c < ½ and b < 1, and since the latter is true by model assumption, C is an ESS when 
c < ½. D is an ESS when  PD >  PC and  PD >  PL when pD → 1, i.e. when c > ½ and c > b, and 
given that the latter is false by model assumption, D is never an ESS. L is an ESS when  PL >  PC and 
 PL >  PD when pL → 1, i.e. when b > 1 and b > c, and given that the former is false by model 
assumption, L is never an ESS. Hence, for c < ½ the only pure-strategy ESS is C, and for c > ½ there 
is no pure-strategy ESS. For c > ½, the equilibrium point satisfies  PC =  PD =  PL i.e. pC* = 2(b−c), 
pD* = 2(1−b) and pL* = 2c−1. Assuming a small mutation rate (small µ), stability analysis of this 
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equilibrium point indicates that it will always be locally stable (eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix 
always have negative real parts) but that the population will always display cycling around the 
equilibrium (eigenvalues of the Jacobian always have complex parts). Specifically, when µ > 0, the 
population approaches the equilibrium via increasingly damped oscillations; however, as µ à 0, the 
population tends toward an undamped cycling of all three strategies around the equilibrium 
(eigenvalues of the Jacobian tend to zero real parts). 
 
For the soaking variant of the model, where it is assumed that loners take up the cooperators’ public 
good without benefiting from it, the stochastic payoffs are PC = (1+xC)/2 – c, PD = xC/2 and PL = 
b(1+xL)/2 – c, and hence the deterministic payoffs are PC = pC + pD(1/2) + pL(1/2) - c, PD = pC(1/2) 
and PL = pC(1/2)b+ pD(1/2)b + pLb - c. C is an ESS when  PC > PD and  PC > PL when pC → 1, i.e. 
when c < ½ and b < 2, and the latter is true by model assumption. D is an ESS when PD > PC and PD 
> PL when pD → 1, i.e. when c > ½ and c > b/2, and the former implies the latter given the model 
assumption b < 1. L is an ESS when PL > PC and PL > PD when pL → 1, i.e. when b > ½ and b > c, 
and the latter is true by model assumption. Hence: for c < ½ and b < ½, C is the only ESS; for c < ½ 
and b > ½, C and L are both ESS’s; and for c > ½, D is the only ESS.  
 
In a population with no local public good sharing (α = 0, γ = 0), the deterministic payoffs are PC = 
pC/(pC+pD) − c, PD = pC/(pC+pD) and PL = b – c. C is an ESS when PC > PD and  PC > PL when pC → 
1, i.e. when c < 0 and b < 1, and the former is false by model assumption. D is an ESS when PD > PC 
and PD > PL when pD → 1, i.e. when c > 0 and c > b, and the latter is false by model assumption. L is 
an ESS when PL > PC and PL > PD when pL → 1, i.e. when b > 0 and b > c, which are both true by 
model assumption. Hence, with no local public good sharing, L is the only ESS.  
 
(c) Modelling the 4-strategy system 
Substituting n = 2, γ = 0 and α = 1 into the model of the main text yields deterministic payoffs PC = 
pC + pD(1/2) + pL + pLD - c, PD =pC(1/2), PL = (pC + pD + pL + pLD(1/2))b - c and PLD = pL(1/2)b. The 
conditions for evolutionary stability of C, D and L against each other are exactly as derived for the 3-
strategy system. LD invades C when PLD >  PC when pC → 1, i.e. c > 1, which is false by model 
assumption. LD invades D when PLD >  PD when pD → 1, which is false because PLD → PD when pD 
→ 1. LD invades L when PLD > PL when pL → 1, i.e. b < 2c. LD is evolutionarily stable when  PLD 
> PC  and PLD > PD  and when PLD > PL  when pLD → 1, i.e. c > 1, 0 > 0 and b < 2c, and since the 
first two of these are false, LD is never an ESS. Hence, for c < ½ the only pure-strategy ESS is C, and 
for c > ½ there is no pure-strategy ESS. For c > ½ there is an equilibrium point at pC* = 2(b-c), pD* = 
2(1-b), pL* = 2c-1, and pLD* = 0 . In this model, C, D, and L oscillate around this equilibrium when ½ 
< c < 3b/(2[1+b]). When c > 3b/(2[1+b]), the population evolves away from the equilibrium and to an 
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all-defector ESS, with pD*, pLD* > 0, pC* = 0, and pL* = 0. Hence, the possibility of an LD strategy 
does not necessarily prevent L from maintaining C in cyclical dynamics; however, the LD strategy 
does reduce the parameter space in which cycling (hence strain diversity) is maintained. 
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3. Supplementary table 
Table S1. Strains used in experiments. 
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Strain Genotype Description Pyoverdine 
type
Strain type Reference
PAO1 (ATCC 15692) WT Wild-type strain of P. 
aeruginosa
I Cooperator [1]
PAO1-gfp                  WT with  
attTn7::Ptac- lacI-
egfp
Wild-type strain tagged 
with an IPTG inducible 
green fluorescent protein
I Cooperator This study
PAO1ΔpvdD pchEF ΔpvdD, ΔpchEF Pyoverdine and pyochelin 
knockout mutant
I                       
(receptor 
only)
Defector [2]
PAO1ΔpvdD pchEF-
echerry
ΔpvdD, ΔpchEF, 
with attTn7::Ptac-
lacI-echerry
Pyoverdine and pyochelin 
knockout mutant tagged 
with an IPTG inducible red 
fluorescent protein
I                       
(receptor 
only)
Defector This study
PAO1ΔpvdD ΔpvdD Pyoverdine knockout 
mutant
I                       
(receptor 
only)
Defector [2]
ATCC 013 WT Laboratory isolate from the 
United States
III Putative loner [3]
2-164 WT CF isolate from the United 
States
II Putative loner [3]
206-12 WT CF isolate from the United 
States
III Putative loner [3]
MSH WT Environmental isolate from 
the United States
II Putative loner [3]
1-60 WT CF isolate from the United 
States
II Putative loner [3]
Variation of 1-60 Laboratory 
evolved strain
Strain with reduced 
pyoverdine production 
during laboratory evolution
II Putative loner [4]
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4. Supplementary figures 
 
Figure S1. Competition assays between a cooperator (PAO1), a defector (PAO1ΔpvdD pchEF), and 6 
different putative natural loner strains. One of the six communities (No. 4) displayed cyclical rock-
paper-scissors dynamics, where the cooperator outcompeted the loner, the loner outcompeted the 
defector, and the defector outcompeted the cooperator. In three communities (No. 1, 3, and 6) the 
loner was outcompeted by both the cooperator and defector. In community No. 2, the loner 
outcompeted both the cooperator and defector. In community No. 5, no significant fitness differences 
were detected. Means ± the standard error of the mean are shown on a log-scale. 
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Figure S2. Competition assays between a cooperator (PAO1), a defector (PAO1ΔpvdD pchEF), and a 
loner (ATCC 013) under iron-limited and iron-replete conditions. Strains only displayed cyclical rock-
paper-scissors dynamics (i.e. cooperators outcompete loners, loners outcompete defectors, and 
defectors outcompete cooperators) under iron limitation, where pyoverdine is required for growth. 
This illustrates that the observed cyclical dynamics were triggered by the differential production and 
use of pyoverdine, and not other factors affecting growth. 
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Figure S3. Loss of diversity in two-strain communities and the origin of de-novo defectors. Points in 
the scatter plot depict strain frequencies at different time points for each individual replicate. Again, 
co-existence is not possible in any of our two-strain communities, where: (a) the cooperator displaces 
the loner; (b) the loner displaces the defector and is then invaded by a de novo loner-defector; and (c) 
the defector, along with evolved de novo defectors, outcompete the cooperator. 
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Figure S4. Histograms of pyoverdine production of evolved clones originating from the cooperator 
strain PAO1 after 5 days (a+b) and 10 days (c+d) of evolution pooled across the 12 replicates. The 
frequency of evolved de novo defectors (producing less than 75% pyoverdine relative to the ancestral 
cooperator) was significantly higher in the 2-way (defector vs. cooperator) competition (a+c) than in 
the 3-way competition (b+d). 
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Figure S5. Stacked bar plots tracking the spread of defectors (white) and de novo defectors (grey) in 
replicate populations of both the cooperator vs. defector community (a), and the 3-strain community 
(b). De novo defectors where identified by isolating 10 GFP-expressing colonies (PAO1) from each of 
the 12 replicate populations, for both communities, at all time points (i.e. 120 colonies per community, 
per time point) and measuring pyoverdine production. While the two defector types completely 
displaced the cooperator in 11 out of the 12 defector vs. cooperator communities, defectors and de 
novo defectors frequencies were significantly lower in all replicates of the tree-strain communities, 
where cooperators never went extinct. 
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Figure S6. Maintenance of cooperation and diversity in three-strain communities, as shown by time-
series plots. Panels (a-c) show the predicted evolutionary dynamics of cooperators (blue lines), 
defectors (grey lines), and loners (red lines) over time. As in figure 2 of the main text, all analyses 
start with strain types at equal frequency (1/3) and, unless otherwise specified, parameters are c = 0.3, 
b = 0.7, α = 1, γ  = 0, n = 5, µ = 0. Panel (d) shows the actual dynamics of our 3-strain communities of 
Pseudomonas bacteria over ten days (average frequency over time, from 12 replicate experiments).  
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Figure S7. Phase diagrams showing the outcome of evolution in three-strain communities with 
various parameter combinations. These numerical results extend those shown in figure 2 of the main 
text, with n = 5, µ = 0, and strain types at equal starting frequency (1/3). Possible outcomes include: 
fixation of the cooperator (blue regions); fixation of the loner (red regions); cyclical, rock-paper-
scissors dynamics involving the cooperator, defector, and loner (purple regions). Some parameter 
regions were not allowed (white regions), owing to the assumption that b ≥ c.   
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Figure S8. Triangular plots showing the evolutionary dynamics of our three-strain communities of 
Pseudomonas bacteria over ten days, where each plot shows one of the 12 replicate communities. 
 
 
 
 
14 
Figure S9. Maintenance of cooperation and diversity in four-strain communities, as shown by time-
series plots. Panel (a) shows the predicted evolutionary dynamics of cooperators (blue lines), defectors 
(grey lines), loners (red lines), and loner-defectors (orange lines) over time. As in figure 3 of the main 
text, all analyses start with strain types at equal frequency (1/4) and, unless otherwise specified, 
parameters are b = 0.7, α = 0.8, γ  = 0.05, n = 5, µ = 0. Panel (b) shows the actual dynamics of our 
four-strain communities of Pseudomonas bacteria over five days (average frequency over time, from 6 
replicate experiments). 
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Figure S10. Phase diagrams showing the outcome of evolution in four-strain communities with 
various parameter combinations. These numerical results extend those shown in figure 3 of the main 
text, with n = 5, µ = 0, and strain types at equal starting frequency (1/4). Possible outcomes include: 
fixation of the cooperator (blue regions); fixation of the defector and/or loner defector (grey regions); 
loss of the loner-defector and maintenance of cyclical, rock-paper-scissors dynamics involving the 
cooperator, defector, and loner (purple regions). Some parameter regions were not allowed (white 
regions), owing to the assumption that b ≥ c. 
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Figure S11. Tetrahedral plots showing the evolutionary dynamics of our four-strain communities of 
Pseudomonas bacteria over five days, where each plot shows one of the six replicate communities. 
 
 
 
